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The journal Konturen opens with a special issue on “Political Theology: the Border in
Question.” It does so not only because the challenge to the border between politics and
religion in our historical moment is a globally pressing concern, nor merely because the
academic polemics that treat this challenge in terms of the question of political theology in the
works of Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben and others are currently intensely
lively, interesting, and unresolved.1 Nor is the line between politics and religion just one
interesting theoretical and historical frontier among others. Beyond all of these reasons, we
open with this topic because the political-theological division is the border whose modern
determination has arguably led us by a—not necessarily “progressive”—dialectical movement to
the problem of the border or limit in general as it presents itself today. The problem of the
political-religious or political-theological border today is of a piece with the problem of the
border, limit, threshold, or determining framework as such. And this is not only because we
tend to manage our problems with the lack or excessive presence of limits in other
domains—ethical, aesthetic, epistemological, ontological, physical, cultural, and so on—either by
recourse to politicized religion (or theological politics), or by the opposite course, i.e. the
attempt to depoliticize religion (or detheologize politics). More important in both historical and
structural terms is the converse: an irresolution within the political-religious border, as it is
established in modernity, leads to a crisis of borders or limits in general, an uncertainty about
their presence or absence. This crisis can be felt today all the way from the never-ending
Middle East conflict and the Iraq War to the mediatic and political discussions about public
religion within the US to the academic discussions about method in the humanities over the
past half century or so, including discussions that may have seemed to have little to do with the
political-theological problematic. After sketching the origins and structure of the crisis and
showing how it manifests itself in recent method-debates, I will introduce the essays in this
special issue, suggesting how they relate to the framework I have first established.
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From the Absolute to the Relative (as Absolute)
While no historical origin is pure and without preceding anticipations, the current
difficulty—by which I mean the crisis of limits as a crisis of Western liberal modernity—can be
said to begin with the division of the Christian Church in the Reformation, which constitutes a
disruption of sovereignty, in the medieval sense of sovereignty as the unity of political and
religious leadership, where religion is taken to hold sway over the political, i.e. an asymmetrical
unity whereby each state is authorized by the one Church. The Reformation settles into a
relatively stable religiopolitical arrangement only with the end of the Thirty Years War, i.e. with
the Treaty of Westphalia, whose determining principle, cuius regio, eius religio, subordinates
Church to State. This reversal of the Church-State hierarchy puts an end to religious warfare in
Europe by providing the stability of State-determined Churches. Further, it seems to reinstate
sovereignty securely in the form of absolutism. Yet the mere fact of the subordination of
religion to political decision, in conjunction with the internal multiplication of Christianity,
creates a rift within the sovereign unity of the divine monarch, because it renders questionable
the absoluteness of a transcendent term dependent on an earthly ruler’s potentially capricious
or arbitrary faith.2 From this perspective, it appears as if the most important aspect of Walter
Benjamin’s study of the Baroque mourning-play is his decision to push modernity back from
liberal Enlightenment into the absolutist aftermath of the Reformation, and to examine the
unsettlement of sovereignty in this pre-Enlightenment context, the double appearance of
sovereign as tyrant and martyr.3
Due in part to the discontinuity introduced between political and religious sovereignty
by the post-1648 arrangement, the religious intolerance practiced by absolutist states appears
increasingly in the eighteenth century as precisely that, “intolerance,” leading to the formulation
of the Enlightenment ideal of separation of Church and State as private and public value
spheres.4 Each individual is to become autonomous or “sovereign” now in the sense of having a
right to determine his or her own faith-commitments (and ethical and aesthetic principles), but
at the cost of making religion a private, individual matter. The privatization of religion, however,
entails its relativization. What had hitherto appeared to be the most objective values—absolute
values—are now subjective. What was once absolute is now relative.
Yet a relativized, privatized, and subjectivized absolute remains, despite its particularity,
a kind of absolute. After all, everyone has a right to their own opinion (sic)! That is, subjectivity
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itself takes on, by a dialectical turn, the status of the absolute that was aligned with objectivity.
Goethe’s Werther knew this well, and so does every modern ego, all the way up (or down) to
Bush-style unilateralism, the “what I say goes” mentality of the gut feeling as absolute
foundation. But as the subjective or subjectivist absolute—the absolute of privatization—is still
aware of its merely relative status, it has to disavow this awareness in order to maintain its
residual sense of its own absoluteness. This disavowal tends to go by way of aggressive self-
assertion and self-insistence, the religion of bravado. Which leads to the re-politicization of
hitherto privatized religion, its insistence on its right to an objective existence in the world. (If
you were only in touch with your feelings you’d know what I mean—and you’d see that I’m
right!)
Limitless Limitation
What, then, is the precise relationship between the question of borders, limits in
general, and this repoliticization of privatized religion that always completes the movement of
the privatization itself? On the one hand, with the separation of church and state, which entails
the death of God or the loss of the sovereign Other (as the secularization of the state leads to
a more general secularization of experience), the human finds itself abandoned to its radical
finitude. One is confronted with limits everywhere, the limits of one’s beliefs, knowledge,
capacities, body, and of one’s life itself in the face of a death without recourse. To this degree, it
should not be surprising that the demand for freedom and the claim to the public legitimacy of
religion so often go hand in hand in our own age, even though this conjunction shocks our
Enlightenment consciousness, which associates freedom with secularization.
On the other hand, to the degree that one is able to dictate one’s own beliefs, one finds
oneself absolutely unlimited—a “prosthetic god,” as Freud put it, but a god nonetheless.
Everything is permitted, nothing absolutely forbidden.5 But the limitlessness here is not just
ethical. For not only is my opinion sacrosanct, but my potential knowledge is endless, as is my
power (and its enjoyment), as enabled by technology. Hence, my limitlessness is epistemological
and aestheticopolitical, as well. In sum, the modern subject is at once endlessly limited and
entirely unlimited. The limits that are everywhere are at the same time nowhere: one is lost in a
void of indeterminate constraints, and at the same time one finds oneself free as a body is free
for endless heteronomy.6 Michel Foucault formulates the situation strikingly in his essay on
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Georges Bataille, although without emphasizing that it results from the separation of church and
state, the attempt to heal the rift within each that becomes manifest through the Reformation
and its aftermath:
By denying us the limit of the Limitless, the death of God leads to an experience
in which nothing may again announce the exteriority of being, and consequently
to an experience that is interior and sovereign. But such an experience, for which
the death of God is an explosive reality, discloses as its own secret and
clarification, its intrinsic finitude, the limitless reign of the Limit, and the emptiness
of those excesses in which it spends itself and where it is found wanting. In this
sense, the inner experience is throughout an experience of the impossible.7
If the idea of God provided us with a limit that was also a doorway into our own unlimitedness
(“the limit of the Limitless” as objective genitive), i.e. our totalized infinity, then the death of
God leaves us with nothing but an infinite series of doorways, each one placing us before
another door, none of which we are required to pass through. The establishment of a border
between religion and politics, then, leads to a paradoxical situation at once radically borderless
and comprised entirely of borders, a situation in which borders seem to transgress themselves
and maintain themselves everywhere at once.8
The current push to break down the religiopolitical border, and to reestablish a political
theology of the sovereign—as a politically directed religion and/or as a religiously directed
politics—should be seen as an attempt to undo this situation. But this impulse to break down
the religiopolitical border itself belongs as a consequence to the very construction of the
border between religion and politics that constitutes liberal modernity. The Enlightenment
project—which undertakes on the one hand the privatization of the absolute as a personal and
so only relatively valuable choice, and on the other hand its depersonalization as public
reason—nonetheless gives rise in a second dialectical step to the demand to see one’s own
specific interiority realized in the external world. (Expressionism was one earlier form of this
demand, a form Benjamin saw as rooted already in the Baroque, which in this sense anticipates
Enlightenment developments. 9) The privatized ego demands its un-limitation, the absolutization
of its personal choices and feelings—”the personal is the political,” we say,
incontrovertibly—from at least the Sturm und Drang or Counter-Enlightenment forward.
Konturen 1 (2008) 5
The contradictory situation of the modern subject, then, insisting on the repoliticization
of private religion as a paradoxical consequence of the separation of church and state, is aptly
characterized by Foucault here, following Bataille, as “impossible.”10 It leaves the subject
absolutely disoriented or distracted (even if expanded or inflated into the void of absolute
values) and at the same time radically fixed in place, self-identical to the point of tautological
paralysis. Not surprisingly, the two most mediatically bemoaned mental disorders of our day
appear to be attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism, limitless distraction
and absolutely self-limiting self-absorption, registered by an individualistic psychology as
pathologies of the sole subject.
But Foucault’s formulation of this infinite finitude as “impossible” is further suggestive in
its specifically ontological-modal dimension. If, as Agamben asserts, the state of exception is one
in which law and fact become undecidable, possibility and reality indistinct, then perhaps this
“limitless reign of the Limit” would comprise such a state of exception (where sovereignty and
its absence coincide), or even its core. The infinite possibility of limitlessness here coincides with
the infinite reality of the limit itself, the brute factuality of the self-identical, which is
(onto)logically “impossible.” Because such a limitless limitation partakes at once entirely of
reality and entirely of possibility, there can be no question of reducing its analysis to a strictly
historical or a strictly theoretical sphere or method. The political theological problematic thus
leads us to a reconsideration of the methodological manifestations of the problem of the
border to which it gives rise. Moreover, since the methodological influences on the
contributions to this special issue range from Lacanian psychoanalysis to Frankfurt School social
theory to Levinasian ethics to new history and postcolonial cultural and gender studies—since
therefore they cover a range of tendencies from the more “theoretical” to the more
“historical”—before introducing the individual contributions themselves it will be useful to
discuss how recent method-debates relate to the political-theological question. More
specifically, I will show, in the case of the humanities-debate around “new historicism” which
gave rise to “cultural studies” (still the dominant humanities research paradigm today), that the
way in which the question of borders presents itself today is understandable in terms of the
history of secularization as a question of the proper balance between politics and religion, or
state and church. One consequence will be that the methodology question cannot decisively
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solve or determine the political theological question, because it is another version of that
question itself.
Cultural Studies Between the Church of Theory and the State of History
To be sure, the method debates of the seventies through the nineties played themselves
out in a state of near-oblivion with respect to the theme of the political-theological border,
always in the relatively untroubled terms of a liberal modernity. The two main recent nonliberal
points of reference for this debate were fascism and communism, as the two large movements
of the last century that attempted to overcome the private-public split, and in conjunction with
that, the religiopolitical split. But these points of reference were rarely brought into connection
with the question of the separation of church and state by those who considered themselves
unproblematically secular intellectuals. Nonetheless, these debates were played out in terms
that, in retrospect, appear to belong to the problematic of the relationship between church and
state. The current debate on political theology (in Agamben, Zizek, Badiou, de Vries, etc.)
prolongs what was already at stake in the earlier debates and puts them in a new light, the
twilight of a modernity whose future and past have become uncertain in new ways in the face of
politicized religion in the global “marketplace” of ideas and practices, beyond the limits of the
West as well as within those limits.11 How is this the case?
The position of new historicism, and then cultural studies, between history and theory
arises as an attempt, on the part of humanities (and some social science) work, to do justice to
the situation of the modern subject, which I am characterizing here as the subject of limitless
limitation. The method discussion turns around an opposition between history and theory (or
in displacements that remain analogous: history and philosophy, or politics and aesthetics) that
tends to be schematized in terms of that between limitation and limitlessness, as follows.12
Historicisms try to describe a reality that is at any moment comprised of a set of determinable
limits, structures of institutions, conventions, and so on, within which people live.13 The past
presents itself as reality from which possibility has been removed. It has no choice now, so to
speak, to be other than it is, or rather was. Hence, it is the realm of the self-identical, the self-
same, however complex the description of this identity may be. Historicism in this sense is
secular or godless. In contrast, theoreticisms, or “high theory,” stand most commonly in recent
discussion for a kind of felt limitlessness. They are thought to move in the realm of the possible,
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the thinkable, and this is regarded (implicitly or explicitly) as either a flaw—irresponsibility,
denial—or a strength—imagining what could be, critically reflecting upon the conditions of
meaning, and so on. Theory defines the space of difference, because it multiplies what exists by
its manifold potential significations and so on. When textuality is emphasized as an equivalent to
“theory,” which frequently occurs from the 70s to today, this emphasis implies a self-deferral
and proliferation of signification through which the same becomes different from itself,
remaining always unstable and marked by its own virtuality. Since signification is deferred and
referential reality placed in brackets for the time of reflection, theory appears to allow, like a
private religion, for a space in which the subject can reign supreme in its own convictions. The
determinacy of history thus faces the indeterminacy of theory, the former answering to our
experience of limits, while the latter answers to our sense of limitlessness, freedom, the
capacity to posit absolutely or to posit our own absolutes in a speculative void (which some
celebrate, while others bemoan its referential emptiness).
What complicates this opposition and reverses its polarities, however, is that
historicism cannot avoid a certain denial of the relativity of our positions because it seeks in one
way or another a factual absolute, the universal and absolutely valid rationality of a determined
reality in the past. (In this sense, historicism is always haunted by Hegel.) Symmetrically, theory
tendentially denies its absoluteness, i.e. it acknowledges arbitrariness, at least in the
(post)structuralist forms most relevant here, even if in the hopes of mastering it, by granting the
relativity of a view of things to a paradigm, frame of reference, or language that is always subject
to further discussion as to its possible universality. The privatized religion of theory is not
simply opposed to, and separated from, the public and secular state of history.
Rather—simultaneously—history aspires zealously to supplant or supplement religion in turn,
insisting on an infinite freedom to know, in the telos of its striving to give an account of the
past; and theory acknowledges limitation everywhere, for example as the conditions of the
possibility of experience, as the conceptual constituents of Western metaphysics, or as language
itself. Theory tends to question any possible knowledge of the thing itself, or the Real, whereas
history pursues that thing as if it could become an object of knowledge (even when a given
historical discourse explicitly grants that this is not possible in any finite account).
Cultural studies, the currently dominant paradigm of the humanities, which arose out of
the new historicism of the 1980s, is situated at the meeting point of these two binary extremes,
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and at the crossing point of their reversals into one another. New historicism arose as a return
to history in the attempt to correct what were regarded as the excesses of deconstruction and
other (post)structuralist formalisms then in vogue. New historicism attempted to renew an
insistence on the historicity of cultural artifacts while retaining the post-structuralist insight that
history is always a “text,” thus combining history with theory. Yet it was often contested from
one of two sides for so doing (and with some justification on both counts, but only because of
the reversibility of the polarities of limitation and unlimitation in association with history and
theory). As viewed by its critics, new historicism was sometimes too historicist—leaving no
room for the subject, i.e. for the absolute value of relative value-posits—and sometimes too
theoreticist/poststructuralist—and so irresponsibly ignoring the fixed realities of history,
whether as class struggle, or as Foucaultian “discourses,” or as coherent structures that went
beyond the “anecdotal,” etc.14 And this double uncertainty continues to trouble cultural studies,
for example in its postcolonial manifestations, as the question of whether the “postcolonial” is a
historical or a theoretical concept, and whether its pursuit is sufficiently “secular,” and so on.15
Method finds itself undecidably caught between the embrace of a godless secularism and the
public self-assertion of an essentially private religion or conviction.
Methodological debates and disciplinary tensions, then, have prolonged, or served as
extensions of, an ongoing debate about the proper interrelations between, and proper relative
priorities of, politics and religion, public and private, state and church, within a “secularized”
modernity. This is because these method-debates try to define the relationship between the
relativity and the absoluteness of human values. In turn, the recent re-emergence of the
religiopolitical question prolongs or extends in different (and in some ways more traditional)
terms the methodological-disciplinary debates. As Western modernity encounters what may be
its limits, in the increasing confrontation and communication of the West with non-Western
cultures as a consequence of the process of technical and economic globalization, the terms of
its methodological debates are being understandably retranslated into the early modern
equivalents out of which these methodological debates slowly arose. For their rise was
accompanied by a forgetting or repression of their political-theological roots, in connection
with what may have been a certain overconfidence about the progress of rationalization, as
thinkers as widely divergent as Adorno and Horkheimer, Foucault, and Derrida, for example,
are still helping us to see today.
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On the basis of this reconstruction of the political-theological overdeterminations of
contemporary method-debates, we can see that the “high-theory” vs. “history” opposition is as
unmanageable as it is difficult to avoid. In this first special issue of Konturen we therefore (and
also nonetheless) divide the contributions into “theory” and “history.” Our purpose in so doing
is both to indicate how the essays will superficially tend to appear and be categorized, and to
ironize the categories that create this appearance, categories which recapitulate the
problematic ones of “theology” and “politics,” or “knowledge” and “power,” with which
“theory” and “history” are commonly implicitly associated.
The Contributions—Between Theory and History
In the “theoretical” section, we include three essays that critically question Carl
Schmitt’s antimodern theory of modernity from diverse perspectives.
Tracy McNulty’s essay on “The Gap in the Law and the Border-Breaching Function of
the Exception” examines Schmitt’s theory of the “exception” in terms of the genealogical and
conceptual affinities its logic shares with Paul’s theory of the “fulfillment of the law.” McNulty
then develops the contrast between the logic invoked by Schmitt’s and Paul’s figurations of the
ontological border, on the one hand, and the very different theory of the border as Symbolic
law elaborated by Jacques Lacan, on the other hand. She shows the latter to have close textual
and conceptual connections with the Hebraic notion of the law. From a Lacanian point of view,
Pauline fulfillment and Schmittian sovereignty occur on the register of the Imaginary. Whereas
the Symbolic law introduces a gap between the subject and the Real, the Imaginary one
attempts to fill this gap, so as to establish a seamless mediation between the subject and its own
immediate and excessive experience. Arguing that a Symbolic concept of the law importantly
tends toward the interruption of violence, McNulty proposes that we elaborate a theory of the
act of the signifier as commandment rather than affirm, as does Schmitt, the overcoming (and
“founding”) of the law in an explosive and annihilating act qua violent upsurge of the Real. In
terms of the Foucaultian distinction mentioned above between “the limit of the Limitless” and
the “limitless reign of the Limit,” Schmitt’s Imaginary figure of the sovereign exception aims to
restore the former, whereas Lacan’s Symbolic law would entail an affirmation of the latter
condition.
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The second “theoretical” contribution is Peter Hohendahl’s essay, “Political Theology
Revisited: Carl Schmitt’s Postwar Reassessment.” Hohendahl differentiates and concretizes
further our understanding of Schmitt’s relationship to the Christian theological tradition, which
turns out to draw upon a complex combination of Catholic, Calvinist, and Gnostic elements.
Hohendahl thus details the theological grounds of Schmitt’s theory of modernity, whose most
condensed expression is contained in his famous claim that all modern political categories are
secularized theological ones. Hohendahl’s examination proceeds by way of a detailed analysis of
the later writings, especially Politische Theologie II, Schmitt’s self-defense against two critics, Erik
Peterson and Hans Blumenberg, who wanted to hold apart sacred and secular. Hohendahl
usefully reconstructs the discussion (from Karl Löwith to Hans Blumenberg) about the
discontinuity or continuity of modernity with premodernity, showing that the debate between
Blumenberg and Schmitt ultimately turns around the question of whether theological terms
within modern political discourse are to be taken merely metaphorically (Blumenberg’s claim)
or literally (Schmitt). The question of rhetoric emerges as of some importance, then, within the
larger question at stake here: the philosophy of history, or the necessity of some decision about
whether revelation is a manifestation of history, or the converse, history a mere manifestation
of revelation. What neither Blumenberg nor Schmitt seems to consider is the possibility that an
undecidability of literal and figural might require us to maintain both a continuity and a
discontinuity between premodern and modern epochs. At any rate, by consciously bringing the
focus of the Schmitt debates back to the question of the possibility of sharing Schmitt’s faith
commitments and their entailed philosophy of history, and by retracing in outline the
complexities of these faith commitments (as well as the political engagements they guided or
accompanied), Hohendahl questions the adequacy of any discussion of Schmitt that would treat
him as a purely rational or secularly scientific political thinker. The ideological character of
Schmitt’s faith commitments confronts in Hohendahl the modern refusal to take (ultimately
private or merely rhetorical-performative) assertions of a personalistic faith to function as
legitimate bases for argument about the direction of the society within a public arena of
individual subjects striving for a common rationality, i.e. a commonly agreed upon set of rules,
norms, and laws.
The third “theoretical” essay here, Leonard Feldman’s “Schmitt, Locke, and the Limits of
Liberalism” approaches Schmitt in terms of contemporary theoretical debates in political
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science. Feldman questions some of the main conceptual bases of Schmitt’s political theory by
interrogating his hasty dismissal of Locke as an “exemplar of liberal legalism” (Feldman).
Whereas Hohendahl exposed the details of Schmitt’s antimodern faith, Feldman probes
Schmitt’s account of liberalism by enabling early modern liberal theory to answer, so to speak,
on its own behalf. Feldman argues that Locke provides a more subtle and positive theory of
sovereignty than does Schmitt himself. It is specifically Locke’s theory of “prerogative
power”—which Schmitt never treats in detail—that Feldman mobilizes to indicate the
inadequacies of Schmitt’s reductively binary approach to the theory of sovereignty. As Feldman
argues, prerogative power escapes both the binary opposition between commissarial and
sovereign dictatorship and that between legislative and executive power. Concerning the latter,
whereas Schmitt collapses the people into the instance of sovereignty and regards them in
Imaginary terms, as a single identified will, Locke establishes the people as an instance of
judgment mediating between the executive and the legislative instances. The natural-law basis of
the people’s opposition to tyranny provides, finally, a theological point of reference that
contrasts starkly, on Feldman’s account, with Schmitt’s recourse to the miracle as model for
sovereign decision.
To turn now to the “historical” contributions to this special issue: we include two
essays on the Baroque prelude to Enlightenment modernity and two on the
postmodern/postcolonial moment where liberal modernity seems to find itself placed in
question. The first two of these four essays deal with the theological-political dimension of the
Baroque both in the cultural artifacts and production processes of the musical and visual arts,
and in their socio-political settings.
The essay by David Yearsley, “Princes of Peace and War and their Most Humble, Most
Obedient Court Composer,” reads the religious politics of music in Bach, more specifically
arguing “Bach’s Christmas music is the music of absolutism par excellence.” Yearsley shows
how Bach attempts, following Luther’s example, to neutralize the politically subversive
implications of Christmas, where “kings kneel before a helpless baby; the powerful pay tribute
to the seemingly powerless.” Indeed, Yearsley suggests one could see the miracle of Christmas
as a kind of “permanent state of exception, which ushered in individual control over belief and
thus presented a fundamental challenge not only to theology but to the social order itself.”
(One might add that, individual control over belief constituting an essential component of the
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modern condition, modernity itself could appear as a state of emergency when seen from the
standpoint of an investment in absolutist sovereignty.) In Bach’s case, Yearsley traces two
complementary movements with unusually acute attention to the dialectical contradictions they
involve. On the one hand, Bach reuses secular music, originally composed for the glorification
of earthly rulers’ splendor and power, for the sake of glorifying Christ in opposition to earthly
values. On the other hand, he uses sacred music for celebrations of the princely power with
which he means to ingratiate himself. Both of these transfers, however, are much more fraught
with internal tension than is generally noted. Political and religious sovereignty are unified in this
apotheosis of the Baroque, but anything but seamlessly, in that the glorification of the powerless
always threatens to contest the power of the glorified, thus requiring an ever more powerful
glorification, a new exacerbation of the contradiction.
The next essay, Steven Shankman’s “Eruptions of the Ethical Baroque,” shows the flip
side of this suppression of the self-subversive potential of Baroque absolutism. Drawing on
Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical thought and Walter Benjamin’s theory of the Baroque mourning
play as eschewing eschatological fulfillment, Shankman demonstrates that an ethical moment
disrupts the political religion of the Baroque—the attempt to rearticulate a sovereign political-
theological totality—in several works of the period, reversing the friend-enemy opposition on
which Schmitt founded the political. In Monteverdi’s Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda (a
setting of stanzas from Tasso’s Gerusalemma liberata), the Christian designation of the Muslim as
enemy gives way to a recognition of the humanity of the Muslim Other and of the subject’s
responsibility for that Other. Similarly, Shankman finds in Rembrandt’s painting of the Sacrifice of
Isaac an interruption of the violence of being in the face of Isaac as the face of the Other.
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and François Couperin’s Leçons de ténèbres, as reread in Paul
Celan’s poem, “Tenebrae,” provide Shankman with his remaining illustrations of the way in
which an ethical moment can emerge in Baroque art to question the absolutist context in which
such art nonetheless remained, in many ways, inscribed.
The final two main essays of this special issue examine the “post-modern” and “post-
colonial” situation that is our own. Ülker Gökberk’s text, “Beyond Secularism: Orhan Pamuk’s
Snow and the Contestation of ‘Turkish Identity’ in the Borderland,” examines the contemporary
Turkish-German relationship—and more broadly the East-West, Islamic-Christian, and
premodern-modern relationships—primarily through a close-reading of an internationally
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prominent work of contemporary Turkish literature, Orhan Pamuk’s novel, Snow. Through a
detailed reading of the novel in context, she shows Pamuk’s novel to present a dizzyingly
multidimensional vision of the dissolution of clarity about the secular-sacred split in
contemporary Turkey. Pamuk exposes the dialectics of tradition and modernity in their often-
bewildering complexities and reversals. In particular, Gökberk shows how the
headscarf—which until the recent past functioned to mark the difference between traditional
and modern, rural and urban—now contributes to the blurring of these oppositions. The
instability of liberal modernity appears in tangible detail in Gökberk’s analysis of Pamuk’s novel,
even as the necessary persistence of the attempt to make sense out of our experience in
modern terms remains.
Claudia Breger addresses in terms of postcolonial and gender studies recent German
responses to the Turkish-German cultural presence in “Religious Turns: Immigration, Islam, and
Christianity in 21st Century German Cultural Politics.” The essay focuses largely on the recent
(and ongoing) German headscarf controversy as an example of the anti-Islamist discursive
practices that emerged after 9/11. Breger shows how Christianity functions still or again—in
mediatic, literary, and academic discussions, as well as in the legislative environment—in
contemporary Germany as a publicly sanctioned religious culture of sorts. Taking a critical view
of this functioning, and defending the broader tradition of secular liberal modernity, Breger
takes her distance also from the notion that we live in a ‘post-secular’ age. Finally, Breger
compares and contrasts the German debates usefully with the rather different context of
French laicism.
In these last two essays, then, we confront the partial dissolution or the potential
voiding of the barrier between modern and premodern, and also of the border between East
and West, in the postmodern, postcolonial, and “globalizing” moment. Simultaneously, we
confront various defenses of these lines of division, whether in the conservative German
legislative defenses of Western Christianity as a German cultural foundation, or—on the other
end of the political spectrum (and of course the difference counts)—in the progressivist
defense of the project of modernity in the work of Breger. As these essays show, the modern
West encounters its other simultaneously from without and from within, in encountering the
Muslim edge of Europe in Turkey and in encountering the pre-modern Christian edge of
modern, secular Europe at its legislative and ideological centers. The religious reassertion or
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the repoliticization of religion that is inscribed as a potentiality in the modern separation of
religion from politics, as private from public, discovers a variant of itself in the politicization of
non-”Western” religions as a mode of resistance to, or rejection of, Western hegemony. For
these non-”Western” religions are rejecting the same relativization of the “subjective”—at the
hands of secular and universalizing rationality—as the “Western” fundamentalisms (whether as
Christian or Jewish politicizations). In each case, an intolerable simultaneous lack and ubiquity of
limits occurs. Perhaps, then, it is this lack and ubiquity of limits that must become the object of
a new, unheard of mode of toleration?
The special issue closes with Julia R. Lupton’s review-essay of Hannah Arendt’s Jewish
Writings. The review-essay provides an elegant brief overview of the achievements and
limitations of Arendt’s wrestlings with the question of Jewish identity in the modern world. The
main limitation Lupton notes is Arendt’s failure to develop any significant conceptual
appreciation of the “covenantal foundations” of the Jewish people, and this for two reasons:
Arendt takes “human action, not law,” to be “the essence of politics”; and the particularist and
orthodox connotations of the covenantal are at odds with her universalist rationalism. This
suggestion that law, rather than action, could be taken as crucial to politics connects
significantly both with McNulty’s critical reading of Schmittian sovereignty as based on act
rather than law, and also with Shankman’s Levinasian reading of the ethical interruption of the
Baroque. Given Schmitt’s hostility to law and legalism—as the Kronjurist of the Nazi regime, he
donated his services (by an apparent paradox) to a regime that was (legalistically) anti-legalistic
in the extreme—it is perhaps not inappropriate that this special issue on “Political Theology:
the Border in Question” should end with a note on the potential social value of legislative
speech-acts.
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